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Does democracy improve life expectancy? Our study analyzes quantitatively 
and qualitatively the relationship between democracy, state capacity and life expec-
tancy in Latin America, between 1970 and 2010: by conflating the findings of  po-
litical scientists, sociologists and public health experts, we outline the ways, both 
direct and indirect, through which this impact unfolds; discuss how these processes 
developed or failed to develop, in a series of  cases; and control this relationship by 
introducing additional political, economic and social variables. Our findings suggest 
that both democracy and state capacity improve health conditions: however, the 
introduction and initial strengthening of  democracy lessen the positive impact of  
state capacity on life expectancy. These conclusions are of  consequence: if  stronger 
democracies provide some of  the same functions supplied by state capacity, democ-
racy and state capacity act as substitute for each other. Democratization reduces the 
need for a stronger state in addressing challenging health objectives, as increasing 
life expectancy, a favorable perspective for developing countries.
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Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the bearing of  democracy and state capacity 
on life expectancy in Latin America. We ask whether and how, between 
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1970 and 2010, the presence and level of  a democratic form of  government 
have been associated with redressing health-related problems and abating 
diseases; with making the physical condition of  Latin Americans better and 
more secure; and with improving health outcomes by increasing life ex-
pectancy. We also intend to ascertain the role of  state capacity, and verify 
whether successful health regimes are the result of  stronger and more ca-
pable states, rather than democratic regimes; whether these factors com-
bine to produce beneficial health effects; and, if  so, how.
Previous investigations of  the association between democracy, state ca-
pacity and life expectancy have been global or more limited in scope, cover-
ing most world countries (Hanson 2015, Cingolani et al. 2015); or individual 
nations (Ewig 2016, Fairfield and Garay 2017). Also, the empirical indica-
tors through which state capacity has been operationalized have often been 
partial and incomplete: by employing a new and more rigorous dataset 
(Hanson and Sigman 2013), we provide stronger empirical grounds to our 
research.1 Finally, although positive health outcomes are highly valued, we 
need to know more on the processes and mechanisms that are relevant to 
this result. We outline a few ways (both direct and indirect; and derived 
from both the sociological and political science literature and from public 
health studies), through which this impact has unfolded in the region and 
proceed to discuss how these processes developed, or failed to develop, in a 
group of  key Latin American countries. Our findings suggest that both de-
mocracy and state capacity improve health status, while the impact of  state 
capacity on life expectancy decreases with the introduction of  democracy 
and its initial strengthening. These conclusions are valuable: if  stronger de-
mocracies provide some of  the same functions supplied by state capacity, 
democracy and state capacity act as substitute for each other. Democratiza-
tion reduces the need for a stronger state in addressing challenging health 
objectives, as increasing life expectancy: a particularly promising prospect 
for many developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we collect the relevant litera-
ture on the topic, and discuss how previous studies have hypothesized and 
empirically measured the impact of  both democracy and state capacity on 
health. In the second section, we detail and operationalize our main vari-
ables: life expectancy; democracy; and state capacity; and outline our ma-
jor hypotheses. In the central part of  our paper we develop an empirical 
analysis, by regressing life expectancy against our independent variables 
1 In addition, many analyses on the political determinants of  public health failed to add 
state capacity as a control variable (among many, Siverson and Johnson 2014, Holmberg and 
Rothstein 2011, Ross 2006). These studies run the risk of  mis-specifying and underestimating 
the role of  democracy in the process (Hanson 2015).
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and their interaction, adding in each case control variables to correctly 
specify the model. Results are discussed and the implications of  our study 
for the field are finally put forth and reviewed. Conclusions, as usual, wrap 
up the investigation.
1. Literature
The effects of  democracy on people’s health have been researched only 
inconclusively. A first group of  researchers found generally supportive evi-
dence: Franco and others observed that “free” and partially “free” rather 
than “non-free” countries were often associated with longer life expectan-
cies (2004). Lena and London (1993) also found that, in a sample of  pe-
ripheral nations, regime type had an influence on population health and 
mortality rates. In short, they noticed that high levels of  democracy were 
associated with positive health outcomes. These results were confirmed by 
later studies, expanded to more OECD countries between 1950 and 2000 
(see Navarro et al. 2004). Investigating the indirect and direct consequences 
of  democracy on health outcomes in a large sample of  more and less de-
veloped countries, Safaei (2006) finds that democracy shows a direct and 
positive influence on various indicators of  population health. In addition, 
Besley and Kudamatsu (2006) suggest the existence of  a robust correla-
tion between democratic institutions and health, ensuring greater life ex-
pectancy in democracies. They also submit that a key feature is prolonged 
exposure to democracy: countries that have been continuously democratic 
since 1956 have enjoyed a longer life expectancy (about five years) than 
countries that have been autocratic throughout.
Likewise, Navia and Zweifel (2003) suggest that democracies signifi-
cantly outperformed dictatorships between 1950 and 1999, a period char-
acterized by a sharp decline in infant mortality worldwide (see also Zweifel 
and Navia 2000). This thesis has been embraced by Lake and Baum (2001), 
who underline that democratic governments have significant consequenc-
es on the daily lives and health of  individuals around the globe. They notice 
that democracy is positively related to the presence and quality of  public 
services, such as clean water access, and to an overall advance in life expec-
tancy; and negatively related to death and infant mortality. Finally, for Bue-
no de Mesquita and others (2003: 194), changing from the most despotic 
to the most democratic regime entails, after controlling for income, sub-
stantial gains in life expectancy and a drastic reduction in death and infant 
mortality rates. Thus: “Infants have a vastly better prospect of  surviving 
and going on to live a long, prosperous life if  they are born in a democratic 
society than if  they are born anywhere else”.
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Other scholars, however, found no evidence that democracy has a bear-
ing on the material conditions of  daily life. Shandra and others (2004) ana-
lyze infant mortality rates between 1975 and 1999 in a series of  developing 
countries, and claim that the separate role of  political democracy is nei-
ther statistically significant nor empirically conclusive. Likewise, McGuire 
(2010) argues that short-term democracies have no effect on multiple mea-
sures of  basic health care provision and under-five mortality.2 Nelson and 
Ross also question the existence of  an association between democracy and 
social welfare, irrespective of  whether the latter is assessed through out-
puts, such as immunizations, or through outcome measures, like infant 
mortality (Nelson 2007: 80, Ross 2006).3 In short, while electoral pressures 
may intensify social spending, they do not always influence institutional 
reforms or resource reallocations: these may also be altered by factors like 
bureaucratic resistance to executing reforms, or citizens’ lack of  concern, 
information or ability to evaluate changes. Additional elements are called 
upon in these cases to explain public health outcomes. Scholars often un-
dervalue the concentration of  social and economic power and the results 
of  political hegemony, especially in newly democratized countries: indeed, 
even though in most countries income allocation is markedly skewed to the 
right, drastic redistribution is the exception rather than the norm (Harms 
and Zinka 2003).4
The impact of  state capacity on health has been analyzed in detail, es-
pecially recently. In general terms, state capacity has been identified as a 
crucial factor for achieving desirable economic and social outcomes and 
(Hanson 2015, Cingolani et al. 2015), more specifically, better health (Holm-
berg and Rothstein 2011). Significant quantitative evidence indicates that 
state capacity affects various health outcomes, such as infant and maternal 
mortality (Majeed and Gillani 2017, Farag et al. 2012); child mortality (Daw-
2 However, he finds that “long-term democratic experience” is significantly associated 
with lower infant mortality. This finding is confirmed in a following and more sophisticated 
time-series cross-sectional analysis (McGuire 2013).
3 Ross’s widely cited conclusions appear to be fragile. A replication study (Martel Garcia 
2014) found that if  Ross had computed centered rather than forward quinquennial averages of  
the democracy variable, allowing for an effective lag time closer to five rather than three years, 
democracy would have had a statistically and substantively significant beneficial effect on un-
der-5 mortality rates.
4 Only recently, finally, studies on the relationship between democracy and social wel-
fare, covering Western developed nations especially in Europe, were extended and adjusted 
also to other regions of  the world, including Latin America, Africa and Asia (for instance, 
Haggard and Kaufman 2008). The historical experiences in Asia and Eastern Europe alert us 
to the fact that democratization may be accompanied by an increase of  economic and social 
inequality, while a certain social equality may also be reached before a political transition to 
democracy.
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son 2010); and healthy life expectancy (Siverson and Johnson 2014), among 
others. Kaufmann et al. (1999), finally, conducted initial tests of  the rela-
tionship between infant mortality and state capacity, using the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators published by the World Bank (also Kaufmann et al. 
2009). Their research found strong and negative associations between each 
governance indicator and infant mortality. Similar conclusions are reached 
in more qualitative-oriented researches: Brieba (2018), for instance, argues 
that infant and maternal mortality reduction in Argentina and Chile over 
the last half  century was due mainly to the policies of  state strengthening, 
especially Chile’s investment in health specific state capacities. The World 
Health Organization (2007) has warned that the power of  existing health 
interventions is not matched by the power of  health systems to deliver 
them to those in greatest need, in a comprehensive way and on an adequate 
scale. States are key in providing good health services; a well-performing 
health work force; a well-functioning health information system; an eq-
uitable access to essential medical products, vaccines and technologies of  
assured quality; and an efficient health financing system. Thus, the number 
of  maternal deaths will not fall significantly until more women have ac-
cess to skilled attendants at birth and to emergency obstetric care (ibid.). 
This literature has significantly suggested that state capacity (or, to name a 
few, quality of  government, control of  corruption, governance etc.) affects 
outcomes independently of  other factors, such as democracy, economic 
development, demography and culture. States and state organization, in 
other words, seem to autonomously matter for development.
2. Dependent, independent and control variables
We will focus our attention especially on health-related results: our 
measure of  health outcomes is life expectancy at birth, which indicates the 
number of  years a newborn infant would live if  prevailing patterns of  mor-
tality at the time of  its birth were to stay the same throughout his or her 
life. Because data on the incidence and prevalence of  diseases are frequent-
ly unavailable, mortality rates are often used to identify vulnerable popula-
tions. And they are among the indicators most frequently used to compare 
socioeconomic development across countries.5 Overall, data show that life 
5 Life expectancy at birth is a basic health indicator adopted by the United Nations, the 
World Health Organization, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment. It is also a component of  the Human Development Index, which itself  has become a 
core indicator of  social development and wellbeing, and is used widely in development plan-
ning and health research. We chose life expectancy at birth over alternative measures, like in-
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expectancy has been growing steadily in Latin America, passing from 53,9 
years in 1970 to 74,9 years in 2010. Inter-country levels, however, are vastly 
different, ranging in 2010 from 63 years in Haiti to 80 in Chile.6
Let us clarify now what we mean by democracy. A democratic gov-
ernment is characterized by the presence of  institutions and procedures 
through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative 
policies and leaders; by the existence of  institutionalized constraints on the 
exercise of  power by the executive; and by the guarantee of  civil liber-
ties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of  political participation. 
Conversely, authoritarian regimes severely restrict or suppress competitive 
political participation; choose chief  executives through standardized pro-
cedures of  selection within the political elite; and, once in office, leaders 
exert power with few institutional restrictions (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 
2019a: 14-15). We measured democracy through the Polity IV scale that 
goes from –10 (full autocracy) to +10 (full democracy); and discriminate 
among “autocratic regimes”; and “democracies” (Marshall, Gurr and Jag-
gers 2019b).7 Following the indications by the curators of  the dataset, we 
consider autocratic those regimes whose values range between –10 and –6, 
and democracies those with a value of  6 or larger.8
State capacity, our second independent variable, is a thorny concept, 
arduous to define and operationalize: definitions of  state capacity often 
rest on the ability of  state institutions to effectively implement official goals 
(Sikkink 1991). A second recurring theme has to do with Mann’s (2008) 
“infrastructural power” concept, i.e. “the institutional capacity of  a central 
fant or under-5 mortality rates, since these latter not always are an adequate summary measure 
for monitoring trends and differentials in population health. In Latin America, for instance, 
increases in adult mortality, especially among young males, are mostly due to high homicide 
and traffic accidents rates, which significantly reduce overall life expectancy (González-Pérez 
et al. 2017).
6 Data on life expectancy were drawn from the World Development Indicators (WDI), 
edited by the World Bank (2018).
7 We omit other measures of  democracy, as Mainwaring et al. (2007: 7): their index rates 
key features of  state capacity, as political order, which are then used to identify the presence 
and strength of  democracy. For instance, these authors classify Colombia (1980s to the present) 
and Peru (1980s and early 1990s) as undemocratic, given the government’s and paramilitaries’ 
campaigns against guerrillas and drug trafficking carried out during these periods. This opera-
tionalization, accordingly, calls into question the independence of  our explicatory variables.
8 Aside from democracies and autocracies there are “anocracies”, i.e. regimes distin-
guished by political volatility and ineffectiveness and by an “incoherent mix of  democratic 
and autocratic traits and practices” (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2019a: 9). They are further 
differentiated among “closed” and “open” kinds: the former display values comprised between 
–5 and 0; the latter values ranging from 1 to 5. We omit these regimes from our analysis, since 
there is little conceptual similarity among the members of  this category, other than their re-
sidual status as being neither fully authoritarian nor democratic.
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state, despotic or not, to penetrate its territories and logistically implement 
decisions”. In addition, many authors also typically indicate state capacity 
through at least one of  three constituent elements: the ability of  a state to 
impose a degree of  internal political order, by way of  an exclusive control 
over the means of  coercion; the proper workings of  a basic administra-
tive apparatus; and the capacity to extract revenue from its citizens.9 The 
operationalization of  the concept is equally controversial: the ideal data 
should be based on time-series cross-national measurements of  stateness 
that ensure wide-ranging geographic and temporal coverage, enabling re-
searchers to take advantage of  variations across space and time. Based on 
these reflections, we decided to use the State Capacity Dataset (1960-2010) 
elaborated by Hanson and Sigman (2013), which covers up to 174 countries 
for the period 1960-2010. The dataset rests on the three main components 
examined above: coercive, administrative and extractive capacities, which 
are measured in turn by 24 main indicators.10 By way of  latent variable 
analysis, finally, the authors identify a series of  underlying factors that sig-
nify overall state capacity.11
9 Enforcing political order entails securing frontiers, preserving domestic peace and re-
straining violence, i.e. to control the territory by both crushing and avoiding internal strife and 
protecting the borders from external threats. An administrative system is working properly 
when a professional and politically shielded bureaucracy plans and enforces policies, and sup-
plies public goods and services; which entails technical skills, competent personnel, restrained 
public corruption, and an effective reach across state territory. Extractive capacity, lastly, im-
plies the ability of  the state to levy resources from society, mainly in the form of  tax, and 
involves a series of  vital skills and instruments: tools to access the population; means to gather 
and systematize complex information; law-abiding civil servants; and ways to secure popular 
compliance with tax policies (Hanson and Sigman 2013: 4).
10 Coercive capacity is based firstly on military personnel and expenditures. A large mili-
tary force, however, may denote war or domestic insecurity, both of  which diminish state capac-
ity. Thus, further data have been added: the monopoly on the use of  force enjoyed by the state; 
the extent to which the state is directly involved in committing violence; and the degree of  its 
presence in the territory (by looking at how mountainous, and therefore arduous to reach, is the 
land). Administrative capacity is evaluated by the ICRG Bureaucratic Quality Index; an appraisal 
of  census frequency, which signifies both the capacity to collect data and effective territorial 
control; the extent of  contract intensive money, standing for the capacity to regulate economic 
exchange; and further indexes related to administrative capacity and civil service values, as the 
Weberianness Index, elaborated by Rauch and Evans (2000). Extractive capacity, lastly, is mea-
sured by tax revenues as a percentage of  GDP. To discriminate between policy choices and 
extractive capacity, however, the authors of  the dataset added more measures, as the proportion 
of  tax revenues coming from income, domestic consumption, and property taxes compared 
with revenues coming from international trade, as custom duties. When the proportion of  the 
former, which require a more structured bureaucratic apparatus, is higher, the expected level of  
extractive (and administrative) capacity of  the state will be greater. Further indicators, finally, 
show the relation between actual revenue collection and the expected tax yield, given per capita 
GDP, mineral production, exports and additional relevant factors.
11 Unfortunately, the dataset is currently available only in aggregate form (based on the 
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The literature suggests that our two main variables are somehow re-
lated. On the one hand, democracy may affect state capacity by reducing 
violence and corruption and increasing administrative efficacy. It lowers 
violent struggles by providing institutionalized communication channels 
with political rivals, by including them into the debate and by acceding to 
some of  their requests. Also, accountable governments make citizens more 
likely to identify with democracy and the state and reduce the reasons for 
violent opposition. By making elected officials and administrators responsi-
ble, democratic processes and sanctions potentially contain incompetence, 
arbitrariness and the dissemination of  bribery. Finally, independent civil so-
ciety groups may supervise and appraise state functioning and collaborate 
with the state to recommend new policy ideas (Carbone 2013).
As for the opposite effect, of  state capacity on political regimes, the 
prevailing view contends that state strength ensures political stability and 
the survival of  both democratic and authoritarian regimes: therefore, more 
capable states promote freedom under democracy, but oppression under 
authoritarianism (Way 2016, Levitsky and Way 2010, Huntington 1968). 
These assertions imply that the state is an instrument that may be exploit-
ed by both democratic and authoritarian leaders: stronger states safeguard 
civil and political rights under democracy, but suppress such rights in an 
equally effective way in despotic regimes (Slater 2010, Way 2005, Bellin 
2004).
Second, we added further control variables representing economic de-
velopment (yearly GDP growth and GDP per capita based on Purchasing 
Power Parity). Higher GDP per capita, and GDP growth, tend on average 
to be associated with higher private incomes and with more resources for 
state provision of  life expectancy: more affluent citizens usually demand 
a higher level of  welfare services and richer countries, in turn, can more 
readily afford to provide them (Lake and Baum 2001).12 Gini Indexes are 
added to the regression because, while mortality differentials among coun-
tries are enormous, such inequalities also appear within each country, in-
cluding rich or developed ones. The public health literature offers evidence 
in support of  the thesis that domestic inequality and social distance under-
mine social cohesion, by encouraging mistrust, feelings of  inferiority and 
insecurity that could lead to violence, disrespect, shame, and depression: 
psychosocial factors that contribute to ill health and premature death in-
clude low social status, poor social affiliations, and negative childhood ex-
combined values of  coercive, administrative and extractive state powers): therefore, no sepa-
rate analysis on the specific role of  each constituent part has been possible.
12 Data on economic development were derived from the World Bank (2018).
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periences (Safaei 2006).The issue of  redistribution is also central for Huber, 
Mustillo, and Stephens (2008), who acknowledge that, even if  democracy 
is usually associated with higher social spending, it is not always related to 
better social policy performance (Huber et al. 2016). Likewise, Ross (2006) 
accepts that democracies spend more on healthcare: however, he claims 
that the benefits of  additional spending bypass the poor, accruing instead 
to middle- and upper-income groups.13
We also introduced land size, since establishing functioning administra-
tions and providing efficient health care may be particularly difficult in large 
states. Sizeable territories may prove hard to penetrate administratively 
and to establish institutionalized services on (Herbst and Mills 2006: 9-11). 
Functioning local care providers have been key in the overall performance 
patterns of  Latin American health systems, as in Chile: their absence or 
weakness, more likely when the state is large, prevents effective health care 
delivery.14 Similarly, ethnic fractionalization may favor the emergence of  
local and regional challenges to central state authority, and thus political 
turmoil, as well as encourage patronage and corruption-oriented politics, 
diverting efforts from the building and consolidation of  a valuable admin-
istrative apparatus and well-organized social welfare and health systems 
(Alesina et al. 2003).
Finally, as several Latin American countries are oil producers (especially 
Venezuela, Brazil and Mexico) we test the impact of  this factor, measured 
as oil revenues as a percentage of  GDP, on life expectancy. The revenues 
generated by oil extraction have not been conducive to achieving relevant 
development goals, as political democratization or better health, mainly 
because of  increasing levels of  corruption and accrued political autonomy 
from the electoral bases, which considerably lessened vertical accountabil-
ity and weakened the ties between governments and the general interest 
(Karl 2007, Ross 2006).15 Only recently, the appearance in the region of  
new left governments has convoyed extra resources coming from oil rev-
enues to pay for expanding social expenditures and reducing poverty and 
inequality (Hogenboom 2012).
13 Data on inequality were drawn from the World Inequality Database (2019). For the 
methodology used to measure this variable, see: https://wid.world/methodology/.
14 Data on land size were drawn from the World Bank (2018).
15 Data on oil production were also obtained from the World Bank (2018). Oil depen-
dence is negatively correlated with health care expenditures: paradoxically, the more countries 
are dependent on oil, the less they spend on health as a percentage of  gross domestic product 
(Karl 2007: 664).
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3. Data analysis and discussion
Eighteen Latin American countries were finally included in the regres-
sion.16 We chose Latin America to ensure comparability within a most simi-
lar research design: in this region, democracy has been a common political 
regime during the period of  analysis, unlike in the Middle East and Northern 
Africa. In addition, compared to other regions of  the world, such as Sub-Sa-
haran Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe, Latin America boasts an exception-
ally high proportion of  full and partial democracies, which makes it an ideal 
candidate for our analysis, based on the impact of  these political regimes on 
life expectancy. As for our investigation, missing data problems forced us to 
consider country-years as our unit of  analysis. Thus, we used a pooled data 
for which we employed random-effects regression models (Table 1).17
In our first model (Table 1, R. sq. = 0.95), the relationship between 
democracy and life expectancy is positive and statistically significant (beta 
= 0.067); the same negative sign is found for all control variables, except 
GDP growth which is not significant. Against expectations, GDP per cap-
ita is negative: a possible explanation for this relationship is that scientific 
understanding and technological progress have made some public health 
interventions, such as vaccinations, along with hygiene and public health 
measures, cheaper and brought these more and more into the reach of  
populations with lower incomes. More generally, if  at the individual level it 
is reasonable to assume that richer people have better health, because they 
can afford better medical care, this relationship is certainly not assured at 
the aggregate level. Developing countries, such as Costa Rica and Cuba, are 
judged to have high health status. On the other hand, the USA is among 
the wealthiest industrialized countries in terms of  GDP per capita, but it is 
ranked to have lower health outcomes compared to many others (Hassan 
et al. 2017). The considerable variation in life expectancy for a given level of  
income suggests that life expectancy is influenced by other determinants.
The relationship between democracy and life expectancy, as illustrated 
in the literature, is complex. Some scholars, for instance, suggest that if  it 
were possible to conduct a natural experiment, i.e. to compare the social 
16 We analyze all Latin American countries with a population above 2,000,000: Cuba was 
omitted for missing data. The countries finally included are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Ja-
maica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
17 To make the results comparable in terms of  effects, all variables have been standardized. 
Although the two principal independent variables (democracy and state of  capacity) are (mod-
erately) correlated (r = 0.603), we do not find collinearity problems among the regression mod-
els: the average variance inflation factor (VIF) across all predictors is substantially low (1.86).
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contract in a given country under authoritarian rule, with the social con-
tract in the same country under democratic rule, all else held constant, we 
might expect democracy to be more responsive to the interests of  the poor 
and the most vulnerable (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008: 361-362). Thus, 
we might expect democracy to have a positive effect on life expectancy 
overall, when compared with autocracies. However, not only such natural 
experiments are very difficult, but the ‘ceteris paribus’ conditions are cru-
cially important to understand the effects of  regime type. In short, the con-
sequences of  democracy are conditional on further economic and social 
conditions: Haggard and Kaufman, for instance, underline the relevance of  
state capacity, in particular its ability to extract resources to offset market 
risks (ibid.).
Yet, political scientists have underlined a few mechanisms that explain 
how democracy may promote life expectancy. On the one hand, in authori-
tarian governments there are fewer procedures that would promptly ex-
pose popular needs and make politicians responsive: democratic incentives 
for re-election motivate politicians to listen. In politically closed societies, 
censorship prevails, no real debate develops on important issues and, in 
general terms, most public policies reflect the interests of  the inner circles 
of  power and the dominant classes.18 Furthermore, democracies usually 
demand accountability to a broader set of  citizens, while dictatorships are 
mostly accountable to smaller groups, as the military, mainly defending the 
interests of  rich and privileged elites. This may lead to massive misalloca-
tion of  scarce resources that are vital to the well-being of  the population. 
Democracies, finally, may count on more effective mechanisms for select-
ing competent and honest leaders, than under authoritarian governments. 
If  health policies are implemented by capable and less corruptible leaders, 
health outcomes are likely to be better.19
18 We acknowledge that authoritarian governments may favor the less advantaged, as with 
the Velasco regime in Peru or with semi-authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Mexico. However, 
in Latin America, dictatorships have been less inclined than democracies to extend welfare 
policies to new sectors of  the population. Thus, under Velasco (1968-1975), the welfare system 
was consolidated, but not expanded. In Brazil (1971-1985) and Mexico (1970-1982), semi-com-
petitive political regimes somewhat extended social protection. Yet, in Brazil welfare policies 
were implemented mostly in order to prevent a revival of  social unrest in the countryside and 
to fuel patronage politics in favor of  the government-backed Arena party. In Mexico, social 
policies were even less resolute and intensified only as political challenges from competing 
parties became more acute. In both cases results were limited, well below those of  sustained 
democracies, while social inequality remained enormous (Haggard and Kaufman 2008: 16).
19 Also, for economists as Nobel Prize winning Amartya Sen, democracies tend to break 
underdevelopment traps and invest more than dictatorships in social services (2001). Govern-
ments that invest in this way typically have lower infant mortality rates, and longer life expec-
tancies, than nondemocratic governments with otherwise similar societies.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err.
Democracy 0.067 **** 0.011 0.061 **** 0.012 0.053 **** 0.022
State capacity 0.094 *** 0.020 0.176 **** 0.023 0.188 **** 0.011
State capacity*Democracy –0.121 **** 0.009 –0.123 **** 0.009
Oil –0.017 0.014 –0.013 0.014 –0.032 ** 0.012 –0.023 ** 0.012
Gdp growth –0.001 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.008
Natural Log Gdp per capita –0.098 *** 0.030 –0.111 **** 0.031 –0.070 ** 0.027 –0.078 *** 0.027
Natural Log Land –4.157 **** 1.135 –2.313 ** 1.117 –2.370 ** 1.040
Natural Log Gini –0.420 **** 0.029 7.750 **** 0.421 6.637 **** 0.384 6.716 **** 0.383
Natural Log Fractionalization –2.340 **** 0.605 –1.341 ** 0.593 –1.309 ** 0.554
Years @ @ @ @ @ @ @
Countries @ @ @ @ @ @
Constant 3.717 *** 1.163 2.019 * 1.143 2.225 ** 1.062 –0.499 **** 0.055
Sigma_u 0 0 0 0.525
Sigma_e 0.184 0.186 0.164 0.165
Rho 0 0 0 0.910
R-square 0.949 0.948 0.960 0.520
Wald test (sig.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of  countries 18 18 18 18
Number of  observation 708 708 708 708
Table 1. Impact of  democracy and state capacity on public health in LA (1970-2010)
Note: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, ****p<0.001. In the first three model we have applied a 
random effects regression, while in the last one a fixed effects regression. All variable have been stan-
dardized. @ stands for all the value related to the countries and years of  the study.
Source: Polity IV, World Bank, State Capacity Dataset.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err. Beta Sig. Std. Err.
Democracy 0.067 **** 0.011 0.061 **** 0.012 0.053 **** 0.022
State capacity 0.094 *** 0.020 0.176 **** 0.023 0.188 **** 0.011
State capacity*Democracy –0.121 **** 0.009 –0.123 **** 0.009
Oil –0.017 0.014 –0.013 0.014 –0.032 ** 0.012 –0.023 ** 0.012
Gdp growth –0.001 0.008 0.002 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.004 0.008
Natural Log Gdp per capita –0.098 *** 0.030 –0.111 **** 0.031 –0.070 ** 0.027 –0.078 *** 0.027
Natural Log Land –4.157 **** 1.135 –2.313 ** 1.117 –2.370 ** 1.040
Natural Log Gini –0.420 **** 0.029 7.750 **** 0.421 6.637 **** 0.384 6.716 **** 0.383
Natural Log Fractionalization –2.340 **** 0.605 –1.341 ** 0.593 –1.309 ** 0.554
Years @ @ @ @ @ @ @
Countries @ @ @ @ @ @
Constant 3.717 *** 1.163 2.019 * 1.143 2.225 ** 1.062 –0.499 **** 0.055
Sigma_u 0 0 0 0.525
Sigma_e 0.184 0.186 0.164 0.165
Rho 0 0 0 0.910
R-square 0.949 0.948 0.960 0.520
Wald test (sig.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of  countries 18 18 18 18
Number of  observation 708 708 708 708
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On the other hand, there are other, more direct, mechanisms. Public 
health scholars highlight a series of  medical processes that are overlooked 
by political scientists and sociologists. Safaei (2006), for instance, notes that: 
“political oppression […] may enhance mental depression and other nega-
tive psychosocial experiences, through the suppression of  people’s rights, 
hopes and aspirations. Negative psychosocial experiences, in turn, may ini-
tiate physical illnesses, such as adult diabetes, hypertension, atherosclero-
sis, autoimmune disorders and coronary artery diseases.” On the contrary, 
to the extent that citizens’ rights and dignity are warranted, democracy 
promotes mutual respect and a supportive environment, which breeds pos-
itive feelings of  self-worth, optimism and hopefulness, which contribute to 
preserve good health.
Free governments have been related historically to better health care, 
as shown by the policies implemented by one of  the more robust regional 
democracy, Chile. In this country, health policies applied under the military 
dictatorship were geared towards the scaling back and restructuring of  the 
welfare state. Although only partially successful, the military were able to 
impose a drastic reduction of  social spending and a reallocation of  funds 
towards the poorest (Segura-Ubiergo 2007: 179-191).20 The new health sys-
tem tended to reproduce or exacerbate inequalities in the social structure: 
while middle class families gravitated towards private health plans, the 
very poor were forced to remain within the public sector (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008: 109). Democratic governments, on the other hand, have 
been associated to greater advances towards health efficiency and equality 
(Huber and Stephens 2010). Significant efforts to expand health coverage 
came in the 1960s and early 1970s, under pressure from the unions and 
from both the Socialist and Christian Democratic party: a basic health pro-
gram was launched in 1964 and later expanded under Presidents Frei and 
Allende.21 More recently, this was the case with president Lagos’ Plan de 
Acceso Universal con Garantías Explícitas (Universal Access with Explicit 
Guarantees Plan), labeled “Plan AUGE” from its acronym. The plan en-
20 Life expectancy at birth soared under Pinochet, thanks to a plunge in infant mortal-
ity rate, although the gain in life expectancy at age 1 was considerably less impressive. For 
Drèze and Sen, these policies raise the intriguing question of  why a government that had no 
hesitation in resorting to the most brutal political repression to protect the privileges of  the 
dominant classes, was so interested in looking after child health and extreme poverty (Drèze 
and Sen 1989: 238). They hint that Chile’s long history of  democracy may have contributed in 
various ways.
21 Under military rule, consequently, life expectancy growth drastically slowed down: 
its expansion passed from 0.99% in 1973 to 0.42% in 1989. During the previous democratic 
phase, on the contrary, growth had accelerated, rising f rom 0.65% in 1950 to 1% in 1972 (U.N., 
2019).
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hanced the quality and access to public health services, especially for the 
least privileged, and offered universal medical assistance to patients suffer-
ing from a list of  specific diseases (initially 25, currently 80). Additionally, 
it established new and more stringent standards for both the quality and 
quantity of  the services provided, which were considered specific social 
rights to which all citizens were entitled, and ensured by the state both 
legally and financially. The plan also set maximum waiting times for the 
delivery of  medical treatment and guaranteed that the required procedures 
and technologies were offered by qualified health professionals (Missoni 
and Solimano 2010).
In the second model (Table 1, R. sq. = 0.95), state capacity improves 
life expectancy (b = 0.094) and all control variables, except GDP growth, 
are statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, the Gini index is sig-
nificant and positive. A positive Gini sign may be due to the combination 
of  a regional trend towards longer life expectancies, on the one hand, 
and the fluctuation of  inequality values over the period of  observation, 
which increases slightly in the long run, on the other. While democracy 
has been important in expanding the coverage and reducing the f ragmen-
tation of  health insurance in Latin America, in the long run health out-
comes do not depend merely on such condition, but also on aspects of  
state capacity. Even if  health systems are equitable, magnanimous, and 
comprehensive in their coverage, they could still show deep territorial im-
balances in doctors’ quality, in organization and coordination, and invest 
money in hospitals rather than in more effective primary health centers. 
Consistent with these premises, Brieba (2018) argues that, compared to 
Argentina, Chile’s superior performance in infant mortality rates in the 
last decades was due mainly to the minor corruption, better meritocratic 
recruitment, and relative autonomy from high-level politicization of  its 
health bureaucracy.22 Chile’s state capacity was enhanced by new fun-
damental laws on integrity (2003) and transparency (2009) in the Public 
Administration; by a cut in the number of  civil servants selected by the 
Executive; and by the launching of  a Senior Management Service System, 
whose entry was regulated by competitive public exams, which increased 
the professionalization of  the civil service. A 2005 reform increased the 
autonomy and jurisdiction of  the Constitutional Court: thus, the Court 
was able to stop governments’ decrees and to protect citizens’ rights 
against powerful private health groups (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2010). In 
22 Data on life expectancy at birth show that, in 1960, Argentina outperformed Chile by 
almost 8 years. In 2016, however, the figures for the two countries were, respectively, 76,6 and 
79,5 years (World Bank 2018).
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addition, state penetration was effective, with better logistics of  informa-
tion gathering, coordination, enforcement and control. The primacy of  
these criteria goes back to the establishment of  a National Health Service 
(Servicio Nacional de Salud) in 1952, which has been maintained in the 
country during the military period. The ongoing action of  the SNS was a 
key point in the history of  public health in Chile and represented a crucial 
investment in state capacity: “By unifying organizations, standardizing 
protocols, centralizing policies and decision-making, monitoring compli-
ance, and sustaining policies over time, it allowed for a decided, coher-
ent and persistent drive for infant and maternal mortality reduction in a 
way not seen in Argentina” (Brieba 2018: 49). As a consequence, in Chile 
the health system was able to prosper on a regional basis and on preven-
tive primary health. On the contrary, locating health centers and hospital 
staffing were often determined in Argentina at the provincial level, on 
the basis of  electoral and clientelistic considerations, which explains their 
poor outcomes.23
In our third model (Table 1, R. sq. = 0.96), we find that state capacity 
(beta = 0.18) produces an effect on the dependent variable which is three 
times as intense as the effect of  democracy (beta = 0.06). The interaction 
between the two principal independent variable is negative and significant 
(b = –0.12), while control variables, except GDP growth, are all negative 
and statistically significant. A more detailed analysis of  the interaction (Fig-
ure 1) shows that growing state capacity is associated to increasing life ex-
pectancy: this effect, however, lessens when levels of  democracy increase. 
This implies that across the countries in the region a positive impact on life 
expectancy has been assured both by semi-democratic and authoritarian 
governments in capable states, and by democracies approaching full politi-
cal development in weaker states.
On the one hand, democratization may reduce the need for a stron-
ger state in increasing life expectancy. Thus, the introduction of  democ-
racy may be appropriate to reach this goal, even when state capacity is low. 
This situation is common in developing countries, where higher levels of  
23 It should also be noted that Argentina’s labor movement was much more powerful 
than Chile’s, and Argentine union leaders put up ferocious resistance to successive attempts 
to extend better health care to poor people in rural areas and urban shantytowns. More gener-
ally, in the last decades, parties of  the Left and the local labor movement struggled to expand 
and uphold the rights and wages of  workers within the formal and more protected sector of  
the economy. This came at the expense not only of  more privileged strata, but also of  less 
protected workers in the informal sectors and of  the poor. Thus, more recently social welfare 
provisions, especially pensions, have exercised a regressive influence on the overall redistri-
bution of  income, reinforcing, rather than mitigating, long-standing patterns of  inequality 
(Grassi 2014).
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democracy can help compensate for low levels of  state capacity when it 
comes to improving development outcomes. On the other hand, the data 
also underline that the favorable role of  state capacity in increasing life ex-
pectancy decreases when countries become more democratic: this may be 
due to an overlap on the flow of  information regarding public needs. Both 
democratic regimes and stronger states collect information about public 
needs, which in turn make reaching development goals easier and more 
effective: accurate knowledge about public needs may arise from a well-
ordered data collection effort by capable public agencies, as well as from 
a free press and safeguards for political expression. If  stronger democracy 
provides some of  the same functions supplied by state capacity, democ-
racy and state capacity would substitute for each other: when democracy 
develops, information on public needs is collected more extensively and 
completely, and state capacity becomes, from this point of  view, less crucial 
(Hanson 2015: 11-12).
Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects of  State Capacity.
DAVIDE GRASSI – VINCENZO MEMOLI250
To check for robustness of  results, we have applied a fixed random ef-
fect regression to our dataset. As known, this technique is an efficient robust 
test that allows to net out all time invariant characteristics correlated with 
our dependent and independent variables, both observed (as Log Land and 
Log Fractionalization) and unobserved. As reported in tab. 1 (model 4; R. 
sq. = 0.52), the results confirm previous empirical results and reinforce our 
conclusions, which remain largely unchanged, since both the original and 
the new estimated effects are significant at least at the 5% level. A final re-
mark on the direction of  causality: improvements in life expectancy may be 
construed as advancement in human capital, which are usually responsible 
for increasing productivity and wealth. Wealth, in turn, has been associated 
to more democratic regimes, as in modernization theory (Lipset 1959), and 
in a series of  additional studies (among many, Przeworski et al. 2000, Boix 
and Stokes 2003). This association, however, has been called into question, 
for instance by O’Donnell (1973) and Przeworsi et al. (2000), on both em-
pirical and theoretical grounds: for not applying to authoritarian regimes 
in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s, in the former case; and for being 
appropriate only to the survival of  democracy, but not to its inauguration, 
in the latter. In other cases, finally, scholars have found that statistical tests 
show that the direction of  causality runs from democracy to economic de-
velopment, not in the opposite sense (for example, Baum and Lake 2003).
Hereafter, we discuss the cases of  Mexico (1970-1997) and Venezuela 
(1970-1999), as an illustration of  these combinations of  factors.24 State 
capacity affects public health by way of  competent health personnel; a 
well-organized information system; easy access to critical and good qual-
ity medicines and technologies; and an efficient financing system. In the 
2000s, public civil service in Mexico was relatively autonomous from po-
litical influence and competent, and service provision to the poor was ef-
fective, favored also by a stronger than average rule of  law. Overall, at the 
end of  its authoritarian phase, Mexican state capacity was comparable to 
that of  Uruguay, Costa Rica or Colombia (Centeno 2009, Table 2: 28). This 
capacity had been built by a ruling authoritarian party as a means of  retain-
ing power, especially when serious challenges against the stability of  the 
undemocratic regime materialized. At least until the 1980s, the PRI was 
24 In Mexico, the period 1970-1997 corresponds to the presence of  an authoritarian and 
semi-authoritarian government; in Venezuela the period 1970-1998 refers to a democracy ap-
proaching full development and then decaying. The countries discussed are meant to represent 
instances of  typical cases (low-residual cases, or inliers, in large-N technique jargon), which fo-
cus on examples that illustrates a stable, cross-case relationship. Specifically, the researcher wants 
to find a typical instance of  some phenomenon, so that he or she can better explore the causal 
mechanisms at work in a general, cross-case relationship (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299).
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able to manage government successfully, providing the political, ideologi-
cal, and organizational resources that allowed the state to facilitate policy 
formation and implementation; maintain legitimacy; mobilize support; 
and control popular organizations. Through these mechanisms, the PRI 
has come to develop programs and strategies that, although not always lin-
ear nor univocal, had a bearing on the complex course of  state formation 
and change (Collier and Collier 2002: 581-585).
Health policies bear witness to these underlying processes. Over the 
post-war period, the PRI became increasingly non-ideological and patron-
age-oriented: social plans intensified as challenges became more acute. Stu-
dent protests in the late 1960s and rural land invasions in the early 1970s 
prompted greater attention to the demands of  the domestic left and the 
rural sector, and significant progress was made in extending health services 
into rural areas: in 1977, President López Portillo (1977-1982) introduced 
the General Coordinated National Plan for the Deprived Zones and Mar-
ginal Groups (COPLAMAR), the first major effort to expand health care 
to lower-income sectors, making significant progress in extending services 
into rural areas. Other initiatives were undertaken by presidents Salinas 
(1988-1994) and Zedillo (1994-2000) to counter the threat of  renewed so-
cial disruptions: their National Program of  Solidarity (PRONASOL) and 
Education, Health and Alimentation Program (PROGRESA), respectively, 
were extensive anti-poverty programs which also covered health concerns. 
In short, in Mexico, an authoritarian and later partially democratic country 
was able to modulate a remarkable state capacity, following fundamentally 
political strategies, in order to provide better health services that made the 
lives of  citizens longer and healthier.25
At the end of  the 1990s, the state in Venezuela was as weak as in Par-
aguay or in Bolivia. The autonomy and qualification of  the national bu-
reaucracy stood below regional average; violence was widespread and 
corruption rampant; and the administration was uncapable of  enforcing 
laws (Centeno 2009, Table 2: 28). Venezuela’s democratic regime (1958-
1998), on the other hand, rested on informal agreements among two ma-
jor parties, Acción Democrática (AD) and Comité de Organización Política 
Electoral Independiente (COPEI); and on oil rents that were distributed to 
business elites, the middle-class and unionized blue collar workers (Myers 
2006). The close relations between the dominant parties and unions en-
couraged new and more generous social policies: in 1966 the government 
of  AD president Leoni (1964-1969) extended social security coverage to a 
25 Life expectancy in Mexico grew spectacularly from 1950 to 2000, going from 47.9 to 
over 74 years. In 2018, however, it still stood at 74.98 years (U.N. 2019).
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broader set of  workers in the formal private sector. Social demands from 
below and a mounting electoral pressure from AD induced the other ma-
jor party, COPEI, to reach out to unionized blue collar workers, as well. 
In the second half  of  the 1960s and in the 1970s, due also to the boom 
in oil prices, both government of  President Leoni and President Caldera 
(COPEI, 1969-1974) invested heavily in health services, such as hospitals 
for middle-class and blue-collar groups, at the expense of  the unorganized. 
Malaria, however, was eradicated and child mortality declined (Márquez 
and Acedo 1994: 163-164).
With the crisis of  oil prices in the mid-1980s, a neoliberal attempt to 
restructure the economy, led by president Andrés Pérez (AD, 1989-1993), 
caused an abrupt drop in social investments; the privatization of  insurance 
and provisions; and the transfer of  healthcare responsibilities to state gov-
ernors (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008: 274).26 The deterioration in social 
services, however, was not mainly the result of  resource restrictions: invest-
ments continued to pour, but the capacity of  state institutions to deliver ser-
vices was severely hampered by mismanagement, dishonesty and political 
inflated bureaucracies (Naím 2013, Levine 1998: 190). Thus, many hospitals 
were short of  basic medicines and supplies, while the system encouraged 
high expenditures on technologically advanced curative treatment in urban 
centers (Angell and Graham 1995: 212-213). In addition, the economic pre-
dicament facilitated a new democratic deterioration and the downfall of  
the traditional two-party system, that put an end to the processes that had 
favored positive health outcomes in previous decades: namely, party coop-
eration with powerful trade unions, essential to promote successful social 
policies under democracy; and an accrued responsiveness towards social 
demands for better and more complete health care, although limited by a 
party system based on multiclass patronage networks and a political prac-
tice that somehow constrained pluralism (Haggard and Kaufmann 2008: 
93-4, McCoy and Myers 2006: 3).27
Our thesis, that democracy in Venezuela contributed to better health 
outcomes in spite of  limited state strength, must confront, finally, a sen-
sible objection: the role of  oil in the political and economic life of  the 
country has been decisive, powerfully affecting the fortunes of  both po-
26 His successor and major critic, president Caldera (1994-1999), eventually adhered to 
similar market-oriented stabilization policies.
27 Life expectancy rose, during the democratic period, f rom 53.7 years in 1950 to 71.6 
in 1998. Figures were especially positive until 1985, when life expectancy had already reached 
69.6 years. Results worsened in the following semi-democratic and authoritarian phase: life 
expectancy barely advanced, moving f rom 71.8 years in 1999 to 72.1 years in 2018 (U.N. 
2019).
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litical regimes and social welfare policies. In this view, oil bonanza was at 
the basis of  the Punto Fijo arrangement (1958-1998) and of  the generous 
health policies that were implemented thru this period: when oil prices 
collapsed, both democracy and expansive health measures entered into 
a major crisis. While not denying the critical role played by oil in the po-
litical, economic, and even cultural life of  Venezuela, however, we claim 
there are reasons to believe that democracy matters for health beyond the 
cycles of  oil revenues.
First, precipitous drops in oil revenues under democratic and non-
democratic regimes have triggered drastically different life expectancy 
outcomes. Thus, between 1980 and 1986, oil revenues (expressed in 2000 
dollars) collapsed from 45 to 10 billion. In 2009, revenues dropped from 
more than 50 to 30 billion, recovered in 2011 to reach a historical peak 
of  61 billion, and declined again to below 50 billion in 2015 (U.S. Energy 
Information Agency 2019). In spite of  the more severe decline, during the 
democratic period life expectancy increased by approximately 1 year and 
3 months while, during the undemocratic 2009-2015 phase, it declined by 
about 6 months (World Bank 2018). Although these raw data do not war-
rant causal inference, they suggest that additional factors, other than oil, 
were at play. It is also revealing that the recent decline in life expectancy has 
been due mainly to rising homicide rates, especially affecting young males 
(García and Aburto 2019).28 A significant part of  this violence has been fed 
by the steady militarization of  the police and by police brutality; by ex-
trajudicial killings in military operations against street crime; by weapons 
illegally supplied by the Army and the Police to control political opposi-
tion; and by the inconsistent attitude of  the government, which sponsored 
violence against political enemies. The role of  politics and political regimes 
on life expectancy seems, therefore, conspicuous. Second, the direct effects 
of  democracy illustrated above are independent of  particular policies and 
expenditure levels: it is reasonable to assume that they would act on life 
expectancy irrespective of  fluctuations in oil revenues. Finally, our statisti-
cal model incorporates a specific control (Oil revenues as a percentage of  
GDP) to capture the effect of  this variable on the relations and interactions 
among our main variables. Thus, we expect that the influence of  oil would 
not affect our main statistical findings.
28 Homicides rates increased from 32.9 to 61.9 per 100.000 people between 2000 and 2014 
(García and Aburto 2019: 3).
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Concluding remarks
To sum up, we find that in Latin America, between 1970 and 2010, 
democratic governments and stronger states have contributed, both in-
dependently and in conjunction, to improve public health outcomes, by 
way of  mechanisms outlined by both political scientists and health policy 
experts. The interaction of  our two main variables, in addition, suggests 
that the positive effect of  state capacity tends to decline when democracy 
increases, so that improved life expectancy may be gained both in strong 
authoritarian states and weaker democratic ones. These conclusions are of  
consequence: if  stronger democracies provide some of  the same functions 
supplied by state capacity, democracy and state capacity act as substitute 
for each other. Democratization reduces the need for a stronger state in 
addressing challenging health objectives, as increasing life expectancy: a fa-
vorable prospect for many developing countries.
Since state capacity generally requires extended periods of  time to ac-
crue, countries with weaker states are often struggling to provide citizens 
with effective social services: these, in turn, are essential to consolidate the 
legitimacy of  political regimes. In the developing world, including Latin 
America, states tend to be notoriously weak, so that their perspectives 
of  satisfying citizens’ social and political expectations are generally poor. 
However, democratic transitions (be they partial, f rom a semi-democratic 
regime or complete, from a fully authoritarian one) and the strengthen-
ing of  new democratic regimes, offer an alternative path. By introducing 
and deepening democracy, these countries ensure a positive impact on life 
expectancy, even when state institutions are weaker. Yet, the effects of  de-
mocracy are contingent on further additional factors, as illustrated by the 
comparison between the cases of  Argentina and Chile: the choice of  rear-
ranging health services at a regional, rather than provincial, basis and the 
focus on preventive primary health, rather than on traditional curative hos-
pitals, explain the success of  health policies in the latter country.
We have outlined some of  the mechanisms that potentially aid demo-
cratic systems in the provision of  health care: a better exposure of  popular 
needs, electoral accountability, the choice of  more competent and honest 
leaders and a firmer rule of  law ensure, in general terms, a more gener-
ous allocation of  resources for health services than in authoritarian set-
tings, driven by a broader social interest rather than by restricted elites’ 
gains. The qualitative discussion of  Venezuela illustrates the point: with 
important limitations, as dependence on oil and the restriction of  politi-
cal competition promoted by the two main parties, the democratic system 
developed after 1958 established more representative and responsive politi-
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cal institutions, and was able to ensure significant progress in health care 
and life expectancy. We should not underestimate, finally, the direct effects 
illustrated by public health experts: often overlooked by political scientists 
and sociologists, these effects are empirically solid and should be treated in 
any analysis of  political determinants of  public health. Thus, democracy 
affirms citizens’ rights and dignity which, in turn, breed positive feelings 
of  self-worth, optimism and hopefulness that are related to better health 
conditions and longer lives. On the contrary, political oppression causes 
depression and negative psychosocial experiences, through the suppression 
of  people’s rights, hopes and aspirations, which initiate a series of  physical 
illnesses that are likely to compromise health and shorten lives.
A few warnings, in conclusion, are necessary. First, reverse causality 
issues should be taken into consideration: the literature on the possible 
effects of  health conditions on political regimes, although inconclusive, 
challenges in part our conclusions. More theoretical and empirical research 
needs to be carried out to this purpose. Second, our qualitative analysis 
shows that good health outcomes develop through very complex combina-
tions of  multiple factors. Thus, more in-depth investigation, and additional 
explicative variables, are necessary to refine the mechanisms we sketched 
out in this paper: each country combines in unique ways the elements that 
allow democracy and state capacity to influence public health, in particular 
the history and features of  each national health scheme; the characteristics 
and dynamics of  their political systems; the nature and variations of  their 
internal electoral competition; the relations with key social actors, as trade 
unions, and so on. Especially important will also be to ascertain why demo-
cratic and relatively strong states failed to generate good health outcomes, 
or why these outcomes have been substantially worse than in comparable 
countries. Further inquiries, in conclusion, are needed to cover additional 
world regions and to establish if  the relationships we have investigated here 
configure a general rule, or whether regional variants are at play.
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